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Abstract
This paper studies how updating aﬀects ambiguity attitude. In particular we focus on
generalized Bayesian updating of the Jaﬀray-Philippe sub-class of Choquet Expected Utility
preferences. We find conditions for ambiguity attitude to be the same before and after updating.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for ambiguity attitude to be unchanged when updated on
an arbitrary event is for the capacity to be neo-additive. We find a condition for updating
on a given partition to preserve ambiguity attitude. We relate this to necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for dynamic consistency. Finally, we study whether ambiguity increases or decreases
after updating.
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INTRODUCTION
How should an individual update her ambiguous beliefs as new information arrives? Much
of the previous literature on updating ambiguous beliefs has implicitly or explicitly assumed
ambiguity aversion (Eichberger & Kelsey (1996); Epstein & Schneider (2003); Sarin & Wakker
(1998).) Less attention, however, has been paid to updating preferences which are not neces-
sarily ambiguity averse. However there is substantial experimental evidence that individuals
are not uniformly ambiguity averse but also at times display ambiguity seeking. For a survey
of the relevant evidence see Wakker (2010), p. 292.
In this paper we analyse attitudes towards ambiguity and the updating of ambiguous beliefs
in the context of the Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU) model of Schmeidler (1989).
CEU represents beliefs by a capacity or non-additive belief. Preferences are represented by the
Choquet integral of a utility function with respect to this capacity, Choquet (1953-4). When
new information is received we assume that the decision maker updates her capacity but does
not change the utility function or the form of the CEU functional. We think that this is
reasonable because in our opinion the capacity is the only part of the CEU functional which
reflects the decision maker’s subjective perception of the environment. The other aspects of the
representation are personal characteristics of the decision maker.
At present there is no general agreement about how to update a capacity, although a number
of methods for updating capacities have been proposed, e.g., Gilboa & Schmeidler (1993). To
the best of our knowledge all of these coincide with Bayesian updating when the capacity
is additive. We believe that the most promising is the Generalized Bayesian Updating rule
(henceforth GBU) suggested in Eichberger, Grant & Kelsey (2007) and Horie (2007).
Chateauneuf, Eichberger & Grant (2007) axiomatized CEU preferences where beliefs are
represented by a special class of capacities known as neo-additive capacities. They showed
that the Choquet integral of a utility function with respect to a neo-additive capacity can be
expressed as the weighted average of the best payoﬀ, the worst payoﬀ and the expected payoﬀ
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taken with respect to a (conventional) probability. They interpreted this probability as the
individual’s best guess or ‘theory’ about the data generating process. The weight placed on the
associated expected payoﬀ can be viewed as measuring the individual’s degree of ‘confidence’
in her ‘theory’. The complementary weight may then be viewed as her lack of confidence in
her ‘theory’ or, equivalently, as a measure of the degree of ambiguity she perceives to be facing.
The fraction of the degree of ambiguity placed on the worst payoﬀ may in turn be viewed as
a measure of her degree of pessimism about the ambiguity that she faces, thus encoding her
attitude towards ambiguity. Henceforth we shall refer to this class of preferences as neo-additive
preferences.
In Eichberger, Grant & Kelsey (2010), we showed that the GBU update of a neo-additive
capacity is also neo-additive. Moreover, the probability used to compute the expected payoﬀ in
the updated neo-additive capacity is the standard Bayesian update of the probability associated
with the prior neo-additive capacity. The updated degree of confidence (that is, the weight
attached to the expected payoﬀ in the updated Choquet integral) is positively related to the
prior probability of the conditioning event. There is no change in the fraction of the degree of
ambiguity placed on the worst-payoﬀ. Consequently, the individual’s attitude towards ambiguity
remains unchanged. We find this particularly appealing. Firstly, it implies that the class of neo-
additive preferences is closed under GBU updating. Secondly, neo-additive preferences depend
upon the individual’s beliefs, any ambiguity or lack of confidence she has in these beliefs and,
finally, her attitude to that ambiguity. We argue that the beliefs and the ambiguity constitute
a subjective description of the environment. As such it seems reasonable that they should be
revised when new information is received. In contrast, ambiguity attitude is a characteristic of
the individual, as such it should be invariant to the receipt of new information.
It can be argued that neo-additive preferences are restrictive because they only allow the
best and worst outcomes to be over-weighted. Though in most circumstances the worst outcome
is presumably death, individuals may also be worried by ambiguous risks concerned with other
bad outcomes such as injury or losing a large amount of money. Thus there is a case for
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examining a more general class of capacities. This paper investigates whether there is a larger
class of preferences which are closed under GBU updating and for which ambiguity attitude
is invariant under GBU updating. In other words, we require the updated preferences to have
the same functional form and the same ambiguity attitude as the original preference. This is
reminiscent of the notion from statistics of a conjugate family of probability distributions for
which a posterior distribution has the same form as the prior from which it was updated. It is
desirable that a class of preferences be closed under updating, since the prior may itself be an
update of an earlier belief.
On the other hand, the CEU model with a general capacity is too general since the number of
decision weights grows exponentially with the number of states. Therefore, to keep the analysis
tractable and to maintain a natural notion of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, we shall restrict
attention to CEU preferences in which the capacity takes the form of a Jaﬀray-Philippe capacity1
(henceforth JP-capacity). JP-capacities are generalizations of neo-additive capacities that also
allow for a clean separation between an individual’s perception of the ambiguity she faces and
her attitudes towards it. This can most easily be seen in the multiple priors representation
that any CEU preference relation with a JP-capacity admits. That is, for any JP-capacity
there is a unique (closed and convex) set of probabilities C such that the Choquet integral with
respect to the JP-capacity is a weighted average of the expected value with respect to the most
favourable probability from C and the expected value with respect to the least favourable of
these probabilities. Thus, for a JP-capacity, the preferences may be represented by the function,
V (a) = αmin
π∈C
Eπu (a (s)) + (1− α)max
π∈C
Eπu (a (s)) ,
where a denotes a state-contingent outcome (or ‘act’), Eπ denotes expectation with respect to
the probability distribution π, and α is a weight in the unit interval. The set C can be interpreted
1Jaﬀray & Philippe (1997) provide a characterization of JP-capacities and the associated Choquet integral in
terms of upper and lower probabilities. To the best of our knowledge there is no behavioural axiomatization of
CEU with JP-capacities other than for the special case of neo-additive capacities Chateauneuf et al. (2007).
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as a set of ‘theories’ the individual considers possible for the data generating process. Loosely
speaking, the larger the set C (that is, the more probability distributions are contained in it) the
greater is the degree of ambiguity the individual perceives she is facing. The weight α given to
the expectation with respect to the least favourable probability can be interpreted as a measure
of her attitude towards ambiguity. The larger α, the smaller is the minimum certain pay-oﬀ she
would be willing to accept in exchange for an act with ambiguous pay-oﬀs.2
We begin by considering the problem of updating on an arbitrary event. In this case, we
require the update of a JP-capacity to have the same ambiguity attitude when updated on any
non-trivial event. We find that, under some mild assumptions, this property holds if and only
if the original preferences can be represented by a neo-additive capacity.3 This result provides
a new characterization of neo-additive capacities.
It can be argued that it is too strong to require updates on all events to preserve ambiguity
attitude. It may be suﬃcient to require that ambiguity attitude is preserved for the events at
which an individual actually has to make decisions. To model this, we consider the case where
there is a given partition of the state space. Ex-post it will be revealed in which element of
the partition the true state lies. Many interesting economic problems can be seen as special
cases of this framework. For instance, if an individual faces a fixed decision tree then she will
only need to update beliefs on events which may be reached in that tree. It is not necessary to
consider updates conditional on other events. Signalling models are also a special case, since
information about the true element of a partition can be viewed as a signal. In practice, many
experimental tests of updating have this form, Cohen, Gilboa, Jaﬀray & Schmeidler (2000).
For updating on a partition, we find that a larger subclass of JP-capacities has ambiguity
attitude preserved by updating. If the GBU-updates have the same ambiguity attitude as the
2At present there are some unresolved issues concerning how to separate perceptions of ambiguity from
ambiguity attitude. Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2004) present an alternative way to diﬀerentiate
between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. But Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey & Koshevoy (2011) show that for a
finite state space, Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci’s separation implies that the capacity cannot exhibit a
constant attitude towards ambiguity. Klibanoﬀ, Mukerji & Seo (2011) and Wakker (2011) present theories of
ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, which are closer to the interpretation in the present paper.
3This is close to being a converse to Proposition 1 of Eichberger et al. (2010).
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original preferences, the prior beliefs must lie in a sub-class of JP-capacities we refer to as
partition-additive JP-capacities (henceforth PAJP-capacities). These capacities are additive
over events from the partition, provided their union is not the whole space.4 However they may
be non-additive over other events.
To understand these results it is helpful to think of ex-ante ambiguity as being derived
from two sources. There may be ambiguity about which state will be observed and about how
informative a signal about the true state is. The information which the signal conveys may
itself be more or less ambiguous. We find that an increase in either source of ambiguity can
increase ex-post ambiguity. However, a realization of the signal which confirms the prior belief
will tend to reduce ambiguity, while an unexpected signal realization will increase ambiguity.
Hence, we believe that for this class of capacities, GBU updating has intuitive properties.
Finally, we find necessary and suﬃcient conditions for JP-capacities to be dynamically con-
sistent under GBU updating. We show these are only slightly stronger than the conditions for
ambiguity attitude to be invariant when updating. If an individual’s ambiguity attitude changes
after updating, then it is very likely that she will be dynamically inconsistent. Our result shows
that “most” dynamic inconsistencies have this form.
The appendix contains the proofs of any results that do not appear in the text.
1 FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITIONS
1.1 Choquet Expected Utility
Let S denote a state space, which we take to be finite. The set of consequences X, is assumed
to be a convex subset of Rn. An act is a function a : S → X. Let A(S) denote the space of
all acts. The decision maker has a preference relation < defined over A (S). We shall assume
that < satisfies the CEU axioms, Schmeidler (1989), Sarin & Wakker (1992). The CEU model
of ambiguity represents beliefs as capacities, which are defined as follows.
4As with a number of other decision theories, the certain event has a special status in this model.
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Definition 1.1 A capacity on S is a function ν : 2S → R such that A ⊆ B ⇒ ν (A) 6 ν (B)
and ν (∅) = 0, ν (S) = 1, where 2S denotes the set of all subsets of S. The dual capacity ν¯ is
defined by ν¯ (A) = 1− ν (Ac).
The capacity and its dual are two alternative ways of representing the same information. A
third and sometimes convenient way to encode the information contained in a capacity is by
way of its Möbius inverse.
Definition 1.2 Let ν be a capacity on S. The Möbius inverse of ν is a function β : 2S → R
defined by βE =
P
D⊆E (−1)
|E|−|D| ν (D) .
The Möbius inverse has the property that ν (A) =
P
B⊆A βB and
P
B⊆S βB = 1. In the
sequel we shall define some examples of capacities in terms of their Möbius inverses. In addition,
some proofs in the appendix proceed by demonstrating the requisite properties of the associated
Möbius inverses. In the CEU model, preferences over A (S) are represented by the Choquet
expected utility of an act a.
Definition 1.3 The Choquet expected utility of an act a with respect to the capacity ν is defined
as Z
(u ◦ a) dν =
∞Z
0
ν({s ∈ S| u(a(s)) > t})dt+
0Z
−∞
[ν({s ∈ S| u(a(s)) > t})− 1] dt,
where u : X → R denotes the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
The class of convex capacities is of particular interest for us.
Definition 1.4 A capacity, μ, is convex if ν (A ∪B) > ν (A) + ν (B)− ν (A ∩B).
As is well-known, for any convex capacity there exists at least one probability distribution
that dominates it. The set of such dominating probability distributions is referred to as the
core of the capacity. More formally, we have:
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Definition 1.5 Let ν be a capacity on S. The core, C (ν), is defined by
C (ν) = {p ∈ ∆ (S) ;∀A ⊆ S, p (A) > ν (A)} .
A special subclass of convex capacities are the belief functions.
Definition 1.6 A capacity ν on S is a belief function if for all A1, ..., Am ⊆ S;
ν
³[m
i=1
Ai
´
>
X
I⊆{1,...,m}
I 6=∅
(−1)|I|+1 ν
³\
i∈I
Ai
´
for all m, 2 6 m 6∞.
Convexity is the special case where this property is only required to hold for m = 2. One
can show that a capacity is a belief function if and only if its Möbius inverse is non-negative,
that is, for all B ⊆ S, βB > 0, Dempster (1967), Shafer (1976).
1.2 Jaﬀray-Philippe Capacities
This section introduces the class of JP-capacities which will prove important in our analysis.
Jaﬀray & Philippe (1997) study capacities which may be written as a convex combination of
a convex capacity μ and its dual. We shall restrict attention to JP-capacities since there is a
natural way to distinguish between the perception of ambiguity and the attitude towards this
ambiguity for such capacities. Note that here we only study deviations from expected utility
due to ambiguity. In other words we assume that decision makers use expected utility when
probabilities are known. JP-capacities are formally defined as follows.
Definition 1.7 A capacity ν on S is a JP-capacity if there exists a convex capacity μ and
α ∈ [0, 1], such that ν = αμ+ (1− α) μ¯.
A special class of JP-capacities are the Hurwicz capacities.
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Definition 1.8 The Hurwicz capacity with parameter α is a JP-capacity νH with the convex
capacity μH (A) = 0, for all A & S, μH (S) = 1; i.e.
νH(A) = αμH (A) + (1− α)μ¯H (A) = 1− α for all A & S.
We take the degree of ambiguity associated with the JP-capacity to correspond to standard
measures of ambiguity for convex capacities.
Definition 1.9 Let μ be a convex capacity on S. Define the degree of ambiguity of event A
associated with the capacity μ by: χ (μ,A) = μ¯ (A)−μ (A), and the maximal degree of ambiguity
associated with μ by
λ (μ) = max {χ (μ,A) : ∅ $ A $ S} .
This definition is based on one in Dow & Werlang (1992). It provides an upper bound on
the amount of ambiguity which the decision maker perceives. The degree of ambiguity measures
the deviation from event-wise additivity. For a probability it is equal to zero. Convex capacities
have degrees of ambiguity between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding to more ambiguity.
For a JP-capacity ν = αμ+ (1− α) μ¯, we apply this definition to the convex part μ.
As the following proposition shows, the CEU of a JP-capacity is a convex combination of
the minimum and the maximum expected utility over the set of probabilities in the core of μ.
Proposition 1.1 (Jaﬀray & Philippe (1997)) The CEU of an act a with respect to a JP-
capacity ν = αμ+ (1− α) μ¯ on S is:
Z
u (a (s)) dν (s) = α min
π∈C(μ)
Eπu (a (s)) + (1− α) max
π∈C(μ)
Eπu (a (s)) .
If beliefs may be represented by JP-capacities, preferences lie in the intersection of the
CEU and multiple priors models. Proposition 1.1 suggests an interpretation of the parameter
α as a degree of (relative) pessimism, since it gives a weight to the worst expected utility an
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individual could expect from the act a. If α = 1, then we obtain a special case of the MEU
model axiomatized by Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989). On the other hand, the weight (1 − α)
given to the best expected utility which an individual can obtain with act a provides a natural
measure for her optimism. For α = 0 we have a pure optimist, while in general for α ∈ (0, 1),
the individual’s preferences have both optimistic and pessimistic features. Ambiguity may be
measured by the core of the convex capacity μ. A larger core corresponds to a situation, which
is perceived to be more ambiguous. Hence, JP capacities allow a distinction between ambiguity
and ambiguity attitude.
The neo-additive capacity defined below is another special class of JP-capacities, which will
prove useful in our analysis.
Definition 1.10 Let α, δ be real numbers such that 0 < δ < 1, 0 < α < 1. A neo-additive-
capacity ν on S is defined by ν (A) = δ (1− α) + (1− δ)π (A), for ∅ $ A $ S, where π is an
additive probability distribution on S.
Formally, a neo-additive capacity is formed by taking a (δ, 1− δ)− convex combination of
a Hurwicz capacity with parameter α and a probability distribution π. This capacity can be
interpreted as describing a situation where the decision maker’s ‘beliefs’ are represented by
the probability distribution π. However she may have some doubts about these beliefs. This
ambiguity about the true probability distribution is reflected by the parameter δ. The highest
possible level of ambiguity corresponds to δ = 1, while δ = 0 corresponds to no ambiguity.
The reaction to these doubts is in part pessimistic and in part optimistic. As is the case for
JP-capacities in general, the ambiguity attitude associated with the neo-additive capacity may
be measured by the parameter α. The Choquet expected utility of an act a with respect to the
neo-additive-capacity ν is given by
Z
u (a (s)) dν (s) = δαmin
s∈S
u (a (s)) + δ (1− α)max
s∈S
u (a (s)) + (1− δ) ·Eπu (a (s)) . (1)
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That is, the Choquet integral for a neo-additive capacity is a weighted average of the highest
payoﬀ, the lowest payoﬀ and the average payoﬀ with respect to π.
1.3 Generalized Bayesian Updating Rule
The following rule for updating a capacity has been axiomatized in Eichberger et al. (2007) and
Horie (2007).
Definition 1.11 Let ν be a capacity on S and let E ⊆ S. The Generalized Bayesian Update
(henceforth GBU) of ν conditional on E is given by:
νE (A) =
ν (A ∩E)
ν (A ∩E) + 1− ν (Ec ∪A) =
ν (A ∩E)
ν (A ∩E) + ν¯ (Ac ∩E) .
It is straightforward to check that the GBU rule coincides with Bayesian updating when
beliefs are additive. In Eichberger et al. (2010) we show that GBU applied to updating neo-
additive capacities leaves the ambiguity attitude parameter α unchanged. In the present paper
we investigate when a similar result applies to the larger class of JP-capacities.
2 UPDATING ON AN EVENT
We begin with a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the update of a JP-capacity to have the
JP form with the same ambiguity attitude parameter α.
Lemma 2.1 Let μ be a given convex capacity on S. Define να = αμ + (1− α) μ¯. Consider a
given event E. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the GBU update of να conditional
on E to be a JP capacity with the same α, for all α, 0 6 α 6 1, i.e. ναE = αμE + (1− α) μ¯E,5
is that for all partitions A, B of E, A ∪B = E, A ∩B = ∅:
μ (A ∪Ec)− μ (A) = μ (B ∪Ec)− μ (B) . (2)
5To clarify we require this equation to hold for all α, 0 6 α 6 1 but only for the given event E. The capacity
μE depends on E but is independent of α.
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Remark 2.1 A suﬃcient condition for equation (2) to be satisfied is for all F ⊆ E, μ (F ∪Ec) =
μ (F ) + μ (Ec). This condition is not necessary. However in practice it may be easier to check
than the necessary and suﬃcient condition.
If we strengthen our assumptions by requiring μ to be a belief function then we can show that
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for ambiguity attitude to be the same before and after GBU
updating is that the capacity be neo-additive. Thus we provide the converse to Proposition 1
of Eichberger et al. (2010) for the case where μ is a belief function.
Proposition 2.1 Let ν = αμ + (1− α) μ¯ be a JP-capacity where μ is a belief function on S,
0 6 α 6 1 and |S| > 4. Let νE denote the GBU update of ν conditional on E. Then a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for νE to be a JP-capacity with the same α for all E & S is that ν be
neo-additive.
In practice, the condition |S| > 4 is not restrictive. If there are three or fewer states then
after updating at most two states will remain possible. If there are only two states, JP-capacities
are over-determined. Thus four states is the minimum needed to have a meaningful updating
problem. The following example shows that there exists a JP-capacity ν = αμ + (1− α) μ¯,
which is not neo-additive even though μ satisfies equation (2). Since μ is convex but not a
belief function this demonstrates that it is not possible to drop that requirement in the above
result.
Example 2.1 Suppose there are 4 states. The example is a symmetric capacity on S, by which
we mean that the capacity of an event only depends on the number of states in the event. We
adopt the notation that μ (m) denotes the capacity of an event with m states. Choose η < 14
and  < 14 − η. Let ν = αμ + (1− α) μ¯, where μ is the symmetric capacity given by μ (0) = 0,
μ (1) = η, μ (2) = 2η + , μ (3) = 3η + 2 and μ (4) = 1. Then as Proposition A.1 shows, the
updates of ν have the JP-form with the same α, however ν is not neo-additive. The capacity μ
is convex but is not a belief function.
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3 LEARNING FROM SIGNALS
In this section, we consider the problem of updating beliefs on the events of a given partition
of the state space. As argued in the introduction, the problem of updating on a signal can
be interpreted as a special case of this. In this context, we find that a suﬃcient condition for
ambiguity attitude to be the same before and after updating is that the prior capacity lies in
a class of capacities we refer to as PAJP-capacities (defined below). Under some assumptions,
we show that this condition is also necessary.
Let E1, ..., EK be a partition of S. There are two time periods t = 0 and t = 1. The decision
maker has initial beliefs at time t = 0. At time t = 1, she observes which element of the
partition obtains and updates her beliefs. We shall use terminology appropriate to the problem
of updating on a signal. Thus we shall refer to E1, ..., EK as signal realizations. However, the
analysis of updating a capacity on a partition is applicable more generally.
3.1 Partition-Additive JP-Capacities
Below we define a subclass of JP-capacities, which we call partition-additive JP-capacities
(PAJP).
Definition 3.1 A capacity ν is a partition-additive JP-capacity (PAJP) if it has the form
ν = αμ+ (1− α) μ¯, where μ is a convex capacity defined by:
μ (D) = (1− δ)
KX
k=1
qkμk (D ∩Ek) ,D & S; μ (S) = 1, (3)
where 0 < δ < 1, q is a probability distribution over the elements of the partition {E1, ..., EK}
and μk is a convex capacity on Ek for all 1 6 k 6 K.
The capacity value of an event D, μ (D) , may be viewed as the fraction (1− δ) of the
expected value of the event D according to the capacities μk. These are defined on the el-
ements of the partition for which the signal is measurable. Notice that for δ = 0 the ca-
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pacity μ (D) is equal to this expectation, i.e., the capacity is additive over the partition. If
δ ∈ (0, 1), then for all non-empty events D & S, the dual capacity μ¯ is given by μ¯ (D) =
1 − (1− δ)
PK
k=1 qkμk (D
c ∩Ek) = δ + (1− δ)
PK
k=1 qkμ¯k (D ∪Eck), since μ¯k (Ek) = 1. Finally
μ¯ (D) = δ + (1− δ)
PK
k=1 qkμ¯k (D ∩Ek). Thus we obtain for all non-empty events D & S,
ν (D) = (1− α) δ + (1− δ)
KX
k=1
qk [αμk (D ∩Ek) + (1− α) μ¯k (D ∩Ek)] (4)
= (1− δ)
KX
k=1
qkνk (D ∩Ek) + δ (1− α) , (5)
where νk = αμk + (1− α) μ¯k is, by construction, a JP-capacity on Ek. Further straightforward
calculation yields, for all non-empty events D & S,
ν¯ (D) = (1− δ)
KX
k=1
qkν¯k (D ∩Ek) + δα. (6)
Expression (5) can be viewed as saying that the weight assigned to event D by ν, is a convex
combination of the weight assigned by K+1 capacities. The expectation of the K JP-capacities
νk defined on the elements of the partition on which the signal is measurable is weighted
by (1− δ). The complementary fraction δ is reserved for the Hurwicz capacity of complete
uncertainty, i.e. a JP-capacity with μ(E) = 0 for all E $ S that puts weight α on the worst
outcome and weight (1− α) on the best outcome.6
3.2 Updating Partition-Additive JP-Capacities
The following result finds the GBU update of a PAJP-capacity ν. In particular, we see that for
each possible realization of the signal the update is a JP capacity with the same α. Thus the
eﬀect of updating is to revise μ in the light of the new information, while leaving the ambiguity
attitude unchanged.
6This is reminiscent of the neo-additive capacities introduced by Chateauneuf et al. (2007). Indeed if all the
μk’s are additive (that is, are conditional probabilities and, hence, μ¯k = μk, for all k) then using expression (4)
we see that such an PAJP capacity belongs to the class of neo-additive capacities in which for all non-empty
events D & S, ν (D) = (1− δ) p (D) + δ (1− α), where p is an unconditional probability given by p (D) =SK
k=1 qkμk (D ∩Ek).
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Proposition 3.1 The GBU update of the PAJP-capacity, ν conditional on event Ek is given
by: νˆk (A) =
³
1− δˆ
´
νk (A ∩Ek) + δˆ (1− α)
= α
µ
(1− δ) qkμk (A ∩Ek)
δ + (1− δ) qk
¶
+ (1− α)
µ
1− (1− δ) qkμk (A
c ∩Ek)
δ + (1− δ) qk
¶
,
where
δˆ =
δ
δ + (1− δ) qk
> δ, (7)
with the inequality strict whenever qk < 1. The convex component of the updated JP-capacity is
given by
μ0k (A) =
(1− δ) qkμk (A ∩Ek)
δ + (1− δ) qk
. (8)
If we further restrict the model by requiring μ to be a belief function then it follows that
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the GBU updates on a partition to have the same
ambiguity attitude as the prior belief, is that the capacity be a PAJP-capacity.
Proposition 3.2 Let ν = αμ + (1− α) μ¯ be a JP-capacity where μ is a belief function on S
and 0 6 α 6 1. Assume that |Ek| > 3, for 1 6 k 6 K. Let νEk denote the GBU update of ν
conditional on Ek. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for νEk to be a JP-capacity with
the same α for 1 6 k 6 K, is that ν be a PAJP capacity, i.e. there exists a belief function μk
on Ek, an additive probability distribution q on {1, ...,K} and a number δ, 0 6 δ 6 1 such that
for A & S :
μ (A) = (1− δ)
KX
k=1
qkμk (A ∩Ek) , μ (S) = 1.
Example 2.1 in combination with Proposition A.1 Part 3, may serve to show that it is not
possible to drop the assumption |Ek| > 3, in Proposition 3.2.
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3.3 Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Ambiguity
Let us now consider how updating aﬀects perceived ambiguity. Recall that a PAJP-capacity is
a convex combination of the belief part μH of a Hurwicz capacity representing ambiguity about
the states and K convex capacities which represent ambiguous beliefs about the signals. Before
updating, the degree of ambiguity is a similar convex combination of the degree of ambiguity of
the Hurwicz capacity, λ(μH) = 1, receiving weight δ and K degrees of ambiguity of the signals
λ
¡
μj
¢
, receiving weight (1− δ) qj . Now suppose signal Ek is observed. Ex-post K − 1 of the
signals are no longer possible. Thus the updated beliefs are represented by a capacity which is
a convex combination of the belief part of a Hurwicz capacity and the one signal capacity which
is realized. Correspondingly, the ex-post degree of ambiguity is a convex combination of the
degree of ambiguity of the Hurwicz capacity (i.e. λ(μH) = 1) and that of the signal actually
observed, λ (μk). The following result finds expressions for ex-ante and ex-post ambiguity.
Proposition 3.3 Let ν = αμ+ (1− α) μ¯ be a PAJP capacity, where
μ (A) = (1− δ)
KX
j=1
qjμj (A ∩Ej) for A $ S.
1. The ex-ante degree of ambiguity of ν is λ (μ) = δ + (1− δ)
PK
j=1 qjλ
¡
μj
¢
.
2. If event Ek is observed then the ex-post degree of ambiguity is,
λ
¡
μ0k
¢
=
δ
δ + (1− δ) qk
+
(1− δ) qk
δ + (1− δ) qk
λ (μk) . (9)
In the ex-ante degree of ambiguity, λ(μH) = 1 received weight δ and λ (μk) gets weight
(1− δ) qk. For the ex-post degree of ambiguity the weights have been renormalized to ensure
that they sum to unity. Ex-post the weight on the Hurwicz capacity is greater. Thus for ex-post
ambiguity to be lower it is necessary for the second term to be smaller to oﬀ-set this eﬀect.
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3.4 Comparative Statics
The comparative statics of updating are intuitive. Consider equation (9). As one would expect,
ex-post ambiguity is increasing in the ambiguity of the observed signal, i.e. the greater is λ (μk) ,
the higher is ex-post ambiguity.
Ex post, the ambiguity is a convex combination of 1 and λ (μk). The weight on 1 is
δ
δ+(1−δ)qk
while that on λ (μk) is
(1−δ)qk
δ+(1−δ)qk . Note that 1 > λ (μk). Increasing δ (resp. decreasing qk)
decreases the weight on λ (μk) and increases the weight on 1 in the convex combination. Thus
ex-post ambiguity is increasing in δ and decreasing in qk. This reflects the following intuition:
The higher is δ the more ex-ante ambiguity there is over the states. As one would expect this
increases ex-post ambiguity. The smaller is qk the more unlikely is the signal realization k.
Seeing an unlikely realization of the signal k increases ambiguity. The result below proves this
formally.
Proposition 3.4 Ex post ambiguity λ (μ0k) is increasing in δ and decreasing in qk.
3.5 Examples
We now wish to investigate the factors which determine whether ambiguity increases or decreases
after updating. For illustrative purposes we shall consider three special cases.
Case 1 The prior over the state space is unambiguous. This implies that the
only source of ambiguity comes from the signals, i.e. δ = 0. Thus, λ (μ) =
PK
j=1 qjλ
¡
μj
¢
and λ (μ0k) = λ (μk). The degree of ambiguity increases/decreases as λ (μk) ≷
PK
j=1 qjλ
¡
μj
¢
.
If the signal realization k is less ambiguous than the ex-ante expected ambiguity over signal
realizations, then ambiguity will decrease after updating.
When the only source of ambiguity are the realizations of the signals, observing one of the
less ambiguous realizations will reduce ambiguity. This makes intuitive sense since there is
no longer the possibility of being exposed to the more ambiguous realizations. By continuity,
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updating will have similar properties when δ is small, i.e., if there is little ambiguity about the
prior over the state space.
Case 2 The signal realization is unambiguous, λ (μk) = 0. Ex-ante ambiguity is
given by, λ (μ) = δ + (1− δ)
P
j 6=k qjλ
¡
μj
¢
. Ex-post ambiguity is given by, λ (μ0k) =
δ
δ+(1−δ)qk .
For ambiguity to be lower ex-post, we require λ (μ) − λ (μ0k) > 0. Now λ (μ) − λ (μ0k) =
(1− δ) δqk−δ+(δ+(1−δ)qk)
S
j 6=k qjλ(μj)
δ+(1−δ)qk . Hence
λ (μ)− λ
¡
μ0k
¢
= (1− δ)
(δ + (1− δ) qk)
P
j 6=k qjλ
¡
μj
¢
− δ (1− qk)
δ + (1− δ) qk
. (10)
Thus λ (μ) ≷ λ (μ0k) as 1(1−qk)
³P
j 6=k qjλ
¡
μj
¢´ ≷ δ(δ+(1−δ)qk) . The left-hand side of this inequal-
ity is the ex ante expected ambiguity of the signal realizations and the right-hand side is what
the ambiguity of the states ex post would be if none of the realizations were ambiguous.
An interesting sub-case is where the observed signal was unambiguous, while all the other
signals have the maximal degree of ambiguity, that is, λ (μk) = 0, λ
¡
μj
¢
= 1, j 6= k. In
this case, we have
P
j 6=k qjλ
¡
μj
¢
= (1− qk). Hence from equation (10), λ (μ) − λ (μ0k) =
(1− δ) (1− qk) (δ+(1−δ)qk)−δδ+(1−δ)qk =
(1−δ)2qk(1−qk)
δ+(1−δ)qk > 0. Thus, in this extreme case, observing the
realization of the least ambiguous signal always decreases ambiguity. By continuity, if an indi-
vidual observes the realization of a signal with much lower ambiguity than the other possible
realizations ambiguity will be reduced.
Case 3 All signal realizations are equally ambiguous. If all signals have the same
degree of ambiguity, then λ
¡
μj
¢
= λ, 1 6 j 6 K for some λ, 0 6 λ 6 1. One may see that
ambiguity always rises in this case. Ex-ante ambiguity is given by λ (μ) = δ + (1− δ)λ, while
ex-post ambiguity is given by λ (μ0k) =
δ
δ+(1−δ)qk +
(1−δ)qk
δ+(1−δ)qkλ. Both are convex combinations
of 1 and λ. Since 1δ+(1−δ)qk > 1, the weight on 1 has increased in the expression for the degree
of ex-post ambiguity. Thus, provided δ > 0, ex-post ambiguity is always larger than ex-ante
ambiguity when all signals are equally ambiguous.
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To summarise, ambiguity is more likely to be lower after updating:
1. the smaller is the ambiguity of the states, i.e. δ;
2. if the observed signal was less ambiguous than average;
3. the more likely, ex-ante, the signal realization was, (i.e. the higher is qk).
3.6 Dynamic Consistency
In previous sections we have explored the implications of keeping ambiguity attitude the same
before and after updating. This can be viewed as a weak form of dynamic consistency. The
condition is clearly necessary but not suﬃcient for dynamic consistency. Here we explore the
relation between this condition and full dynamic consistency. We find that the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for dynamic consistency are only slightly stronger. We view this as intuitive
since changes in ambiguity attitude when updating are likely to be a major cause of dynamic
inconsistency. First we define dynamic consistency.
Definition 3.2 Preferences are said to be dynamically consistent with respect to a partition,
E1, ..., EK if
R
u (ak) dνEk >
R
u (bk) dνEk , for 1 6 k 6 K; implies
R
u (a) dν >
R
u (b) dν. Here
ak ∈ A (Ek) denotes the restriction of act a to the event Ek, where A (Ek) denotes the set of all
acts on Ek, i.e. the set of all functions f : Ek → X.
This says that if a given act is never optimal in the second period the individual will not
choose that act in the first period.
We now make some additional assumptions of a technical nature. In particular, we assume
that the utility function is continuous and that no state is null in the sense that increasing the
utility in that state, while not decreasing it in any other state, will lead to a strictly preferred
option.
Assumption 3.1 The utility function u : X → R is continuous.
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Assumption 3.2 (Strong Monotonicity) For two acts a, b ∈ A (S) , if ∃sˆ ∈ S, such that
u(a(sˆ)) > u(b(sˆ)) and ∀s ∈ S, u(a(s)) > u(b(s)) then a Â b.
We shall also restrict attention to dynamic settings in which uncertainty about the realization
of the signal is non-trivial and where no realization of a signal fully resolves all uncertainty. That
is, the signal partition consists of at least two non-empty sets and no element of the partition
is a singleton.
Definition 3.3 We say that the partition E1, ..., EK is non-trivial, if K > 2 and |Ek| > 2, for
1 6 k 6 K.
The next result finds a necessary and suﬃcient condition for dynamic consistency. The
convex part of the JP-capacity must be additive over the given partition.
Proposition 3.5 Let E1, ..., EK be a non-trivial partition of S. If a decision maker has CEU
preferences, which satisfy Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 with beliefs represented by a JP-capacity
ν = αμ+ (1− α) μ¯, where α 6= 12 , and she updates her preferences with GBU updating then the
following conditions are equivalent:7
1. The decision maker is dynamically consistent.
2.
PK
k=1 μ(Ek) = 1.
Both the result and the proof are extensions of Theorem 2.1 in Eichberger, Grant & Kelsey
(2005) who, in turn, extended an earlier result in Sarin & Wakker (1998). The main diﬀerence
is that we have dropped the assumption of ambiguity aversion made in the earlier paper. In the
case where α = 12 the suﬃciency proof still holds, however we conjecture that this condition is
no longer necessary for dynamic consistency. For related research see Dominiak & Lefort (2011)
especially Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 5.1.
7We do not use the full strength of Assumption 3.2. In fact we only need it to apply to the events C and D
in the proof of Proposition 3.5.
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Keeping ambiguity attitude unchanged when updating can be seen as a weak form of dynamic
consistency. Propositions 3.2 and 3.5 reveal that δ = 0 is the only additional restriction imposed
by full dynamic consistency. This implies that first period beliefs are additive or that there is
no ambiguity about which signal we shall see. It is clear that changes in ambiguity attitude
could be a source of dynamic inconsistency. For δ = 0, changes in ambiguity attitude are the
only reason for violations of dynamic consistency.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper studies learning and ambiguity. We have extended previous work on updating
ambiguous beliefs by allowing for the possibility of ambiguity seeking behaviour in some choices
and ambiguity aversion in others. The main principle used in this paper is that ambiguity
attitude should be preserved by updating, while beliefs and perceptions of ambiguity may be
revised when new information is received. We believe the principle that updating should not
change ambiguity attitude, may be applicable more generally, for instance to other models of
ambiguity or to behaviour in games.
One might note that there is a connection between the results of section 2 and 3. If we
consider updates on an arbitrary event, the condition for dynamic consistency is that beliefs be
additive and the condition for ambiguity attitude to be constant is that beliefs be neo-additive.
If we only consider updates on a given partition, the condition for dynamic consistency is that
beliefs be additive over that partition and the condition for ambiguity attitude to be constant
is that they be neo-additive over the partition.8
A PROOFS
This appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text.
Proof of Lemma 2.1 Consider A & E, then
8By neo-additive we mean additive except on events where extreme outcomes occur.
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νE (A) =
αμ(A)+(1−α)(1−μ(Ac))
αμ(A)+(1−α)(1−μ(Ac))+1−αμ(A∪Ec)−(1−α)(1−μ((A∪Ec)c))
= αμ(A)+(1−α)(1−μ(A
c))
α[μ(A)−1+μ(B∪Ec)−μ(A∪Ec)+(1−μ(B))]+1−μ(B∪Ec)+μ(B)
= αμ(A)+(1−α)(1−μ(B∪E
c))
α[μ(A)−μ(A∪Ec)+μ(B∪Ec)−μ(B)]+1−μ(B∪Ec)+μ(B) .
Suﬃciency If μ (A ∪Ec)− μ (A) = μ (B ∪Ec)− μ (B) , then
νE (A) =
αμ (A)
1− μ (B ∪Ec) + μ (B) + (1− α)
µ
1− μ (B ∪Ec)
1− μ (B ∪Ec) + μ (B)
¶
(11)
=
αμ (A)
1− μ (A ∪Ec) + μ (A) + (1− α)
µ
1− μ (E\A)
1− μ (A ∪Ec) + μ (A)
¶
,
which has the JP form with the same ambiguity attitude parameter α.
Necessity If ναE (A) = ασ (A) + (1− α) σ¯ (A) , where 0 6 α 6 1 and σ is a convex capacity
on E, then αμ(A)+(1−α)(1−μ(A
c))
α[μ(A)−μ(A∪Ec)+μ(B∪Ec)−μ(B)]+1−μ(B∪Ec)+μ(B) = ασ (A) + (1− α) σ¯ (A) .
This equation has the form aα+bcα+d = eα + f, where c = μ (A) + μ (A
c) − μ (A ∪Ec) −
μ ((A ∪Ec)c) , etc. Cross multiplying, aα + b = α2ce + (fc+ de)α + fd. Equating coeﬃcients
we obtain: ce = 0, a = (fc+ de) , b = fd.
Unless σ is the complete uncertainty capacity, there exists A such that σ (A) = e 6= 0, which
implies c = 0. (Note one can easily show that the result holds if σ is the complete uncertainty
capacity.) Hence μ (A)− μ (A ∪Ec) + μ (B ∪Ec)− μ (B) , holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Suﬃciency follows from Proposition 1 of Eichberger et al.
(2010).
Necessity Suppose that μ is a belief function and let β denote the Möbius inverse of μ. It is
suﬃcient to show βB = 0 unless B = S or B is a singleton.
Let sˆ denote a given state. Let E = S\sˆ, then Ec = {sˆ} . Take σ ∈ E. Let A = E\ {σ} and
B = {σ} . Then by equation (2), μ (A ∪Ec) − μ (A) = μ (B ∪Ec) − μ (B) . Rewriting this in
terms of the Möbius inverse we obtain:
P
D⊆A∪Ec βD −
P
D⊆A βD =
P
D⊆σ∪Ec βD − βσ.
This may be reorganized as,
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P
D⊆A βD + βsˆ +
P
D⊆A βD∪sˆ −
P
D⊆A βD = βσ + βsˆ + βσsˆ − βσ.
Simplifying
βσsˆ =
X
D⊆A
βD∪sˆ. (12)
Hence βσsˆ >
P
s0 6=sˆ,σ βs0sˆ, since we have deleted some non-negative terms from the rhs.
Summing over σ,
P
σ 6=sˆ βσsˆ >
P
σ 6=sˆ
P
s0 6=sˆ,σ βs0sˆ = (n− 2)
P
s0 6=sˆ βs0sˆ.
9 Note that the
two sums are identical. Hence if n > 4 this implies βs0sˆ = 0 for all s0, sˆ ∈ S. Substituting into
equation (12),
P
D⊆A βD∪sˆ = 0. Since βD∪sˆ > 0, this implies βD∪sˆ = 0 for allD ⊆ A. If we recall
that sˆ and A were chosen arbitrarily, this establishes that βG = 0, for all G, 2 6 |G| 6 n− 1.
Proposition A.1 If we define a JP-capacity ν, by ν = αμ+ (1− α) μ¯, where μ is the capacity
from Example 2.1 then for all E ⊆ S :
1. The GBU update νE is a JP-capacity with the same ambiguity attitude parameter α.
However ν is not neo-additive and μ is not a belief function;
2. If E is any 3-element event. Then the GBU update of ν conditional on E is νE =
αμE + (1− α) μ¯E, where μE is the symmetric convex capacity on E defined by μE (0) =
0, μE (1) =
η
1−η− , μE (2) =
2η+
1−η− and μE (3) = 1;
3. If E is any 2-element event, νE = αμE + (1− α) μ¯E where μE is the symmetric convex
capacity on E given by μE (0) = 0, μE (1) =
η
1−2η−2 , μE (2) = 1.
Proof. First we shall show that μ is convex and satisfies equation (2), which establishes
that the GBU update of ν is a JP capacity with the same α. Equation (2) requires that
μ (3)− μ (2) = μ (2)− μ (1) or 3η + 2− (2η + ) = 2η + − η, which clearly holds.
Convexity is satisfied since:
1. 1 > 2μ (3) − μ (2) ⇔ 1 > 6η + 4 − (2η + ) = 4η + 2, which holds since η < 14 and
 < 14 − η;
9Since E contains n− 2 elements other than s0.
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2. μ (3) > 2μ (2)− μ (1)⇔ 3η + 2 > 2 (2η + )− η, which always holds;
3. μ (2) > 2μ (1)⇔ μ (2) = 2η +  > 2η.
The Möbius inverse of μ is: β1 = η, β2 = , β3 = −, where βj denotes the Möbius inverse
of a set with j states for 1 6 j 6 3. Since the Möbius inverse has some negative values, μ is not
a belief function.
To show the updates have the given form We only need to consider the updates condi-
tional on 2 and 3-element events, since updating on a 1-element event is trivial. Let E be an
arbitrary 3-element event. Let C be a 2-element subset of E. By equation (11), the GBU-update
is given by: νE (C) =
αμ(C)+(1−α)(1−μ(Cc))
1−μ(Cc)+μ((C∪Ec)c) . Thus
νE (C) =
α (2η + )
1− η −  + (1− α)
µ
1− η
1− η − 
¶
. (13)
Similarly if G is a 1-element subset of E, equation (11) implies that the GBU-update is
νE (G) = α
η
1− η −  + (1− α)
µ
1− 2η + 
1− η − 
¶
. (14)
This establishes part (2).
Now consider the updates of ν conditional on a 2-element event. Let E denote an arbitrary
2-element event, let A be a non-trivial subset of E and let B = E\A. Then by equation (11)
the GBU update is given by νE (A) =
αμ(A)+(1−α)(1−μ(Ac))
1−μ(Ac)+μ((A∪Ec)c)
= α
µ
η
1− 2η − 2
¶
+ (1− α)
µ
1− η
1− 2η − 2
¶
,
which establishes part 3. Note that 1− 2η− 2 > 1− 2η− 12 +2η = 12 . Since η < 14 this implies
that μE is convex.
The example may be understood by considering the symmetric neo-additive capacity defined
by κ (A) = |A| (η + ) , A & S, κ (S) = 1. Let a be an act such that a (s1) > ... > a (s4) . Then
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the Choquet integral of a with respect to κ is:
a (s1) (η + ) + a (s2) (η + ) + a (s3) (η + ) + a (s4) (1− 3η − 3) .
Compare this with the Choquet integral of a with respect to μ:
a (s1) (η) + a (s2) (η + ) + a (s3) (η + ) + a (s4) (1− 3η − 2) .
One can see that μ is similar to κ except that it under-weights the best outcome as well as
over-weighting the worst outcome in the Choquet integral.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Suppose that Ek is observed. Let νˆk denote the GBU update
of ν conditional on Ek. By definition, νˆk (A) =
(1−α)δ+(1−δ)qkνk(A∩Ek)
(1−α)δ+(1−δ)qkνk(A∩Ek)+αδ+(1−δ)qkν¯k(Ac∩Ek)
=
(1− α) δ + (1− δ) qkνk (A ∩Ek)
δ + (1− δ) qk
.
Set δˆ := δδ+(1−δ)qk and we obtain the right-hand side expression of equation (7). To obtain the
expression in equation (8), notice that (1−α)δ+(1−δ)qkνk(A∩Ek)δ+(1−δ)qk
=
(1− α) δ + (1− δ) qk [αμk (A ∩Ek) + (1− α) μ¯k (A ∩Ek)]
δ + (1− δ) qk
= α
µ
(1− δ) qkμk (A ∩Ek)
δ + (1− δ) qk
¶
+ (1− α)
µ
δ + (1− δ) qkμ¯k (A ∩Ek)
δ + (1− δ) qk
¶
= α
µ
(1− δ) qkμk (A ∩Ek)
δ + (1− δ) qk
¶
+ (1− α)
µ
1− (1− δ) qkμk (A
c ∩Ek)
δ + (1− δ) qk
¶
.
The following lemma assumes that ambiguity attitude is constant and shows that if a set
consists of the union of subsets of two diﬀerent elements of the partition then its Möbius inverse
must be zero.
Lemma A.1 Let E1, ..., EK be a partition of S, where |Ek| > 3, for 1 6 k 6 K. Consider a
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JP-capacity ν = αμ+(1− α) μ¯, where μ is a belief function on S and 0 6 α 6 1. Let νEk denote
the GBU update of ν conditional on Ek. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for νEk to
be a JP-capacity with the same α for 1 6 k 6 K is that for A ⊆ Ek, and for all non-empty
F ⊆ Eck, βA∪F = 0, for 1 6 k 6 K.
Proof. Suﬃciency follows from Proposition 3.1.
Necessity Let μ be a belief function and let β denote the Möbius inverse of μ. By
equation (2), for all A,B such that A ∪B = Ek, A ∩B = ∅.
μ (A ∪Eck)− μ (A) = μ (B ∪Eck)− μ (B) . (15)
Consider a given element of the partition Ek. Assume Ek = {σ1, ..., σL} . We claim that for
A ⊆ Ek, all non-empty F ⊆ Eck, βA∪F = 0. We shall proceed by induction on the number of
states in A.
Step 1 |A| = 1. In this case A = {σc} for some c, 1 6 c 6 L. By equation (15),
μ (σc ∪Eck) − μ (σc) = μ ((Ek\σc) ∪Eck) − μ (Ek\σc) . Rewriting in terms of the Möbius
inverse,
P
D⊆(σc∪Eck)
βD − β{σc} =
P
D⊆(Ek\σc)∪Eck βD −
P
D⊆(Ek\σc) βD
or
P
D⊆Eck
βD +
P
D⊆Eck
βD∪σc − β{σc} =
P
D⊆Eck
βD +
P
D⊆(Ek\σc)∪Eck
D*Eck
βD −
P
D⊆(Ek\σc) βD,
which implies
P
D⊆Eck
D 6=∅
βD∪σc =
P
D⊆(Ek\σc)∪Eck,D*Eck,D*(Ek\σc) βD.
Hence
P
D⊆Eck
D 6=∅
βD∪σc >
P
j 6=c
P
D⊆Eck
D 6=∅
βD∪σj , since we have deleted some non-negative terms
from the rhs. Summing over c,
PL
c=1
P
D⊆Eck
D 6=∅
βD∪σc > (L− 1)
P
D⊆Eck
D 6=∅
βD∪σc . Since L > 3, this
implies
P
D⊆Eck
D 6=∅
βD∪σc = 0. Since βD∪σc > 0, for 1 6 c 6 L, we may deduce βD∪σc = 0, for all
non-empty D ⊆ Eck. This establishes the result in the case where |A| = 1.
Inductive step Now take a given set A ⊆ Ek. Our inductive hypothesis is that for all strictly
smaller subsets B of Ek, βB∪F = 0, for all non-empty F ⊆ Eck. There are two cases to consider.
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Case 1 |A| 6 L2 In this case we may chooseG ⊆ Ek such that |G| = |A|−1 and G∩A = ∅.
Let H = Ek\G. Note that A ⊆ H. By equation (2), μ (G ∪Eck)− μ (G) = μ (H ∪Eck)− μ (H) .
Rewriting this in terms of the Möbius inverse we obtain:P
D⊆(G∪Eck)
βD −
P
D⊆G βD =
P
D⊆(H∪Eck)
βD −
P
D⊆H βD.
Expanding
P
D⊆Eck
βD +
P
D⊆G βD +
P
D⊆(G∪Eck),D*G,D*Eck
βD −
P
D⊆G βD
=
P
D⊆Eck
βD +
P
D⊆H βD +
P
D⊆(H∪Eck),D*H,D*Eck
−
P
D⊆H βD.
This may be simplified to:
X
D⊆(G∪Eck),D*G,D*Eck
βD =
X
D⊆(H∪Eck),D*H,D*Eck
βD. (16)
Recall that by the inductive hypothesis βB∪F = 0, for subsets B of Ek strictly smaller than
A and non-empty F ⊆ Eck. Thus all terms on the lhs of equation (16) are zero. i.e. 0 =P
D⊆(H∪Eck),D*H,D*Eck
βD. Since μ is, by assumption, a belief function, all the β’s are non-
negative, which implies βD = 0 for all D ⊆ (H ∪Eck) ,D * EckD * H. In particular βA∪F = 0,
for all non-empty F ⊆ Eck. This completes the proof of this case.
Case 2, |A| > L2 Let Q = Ek\A. Then |A| > |Q| . By equation (2), μ (A ∪Eck)− μ (A) =
μ (Q ∪Eck)− μ (Q) . Rewriting this in terms of the Möbius inverse we obtain:P
D⊆(A∪Eck)
βD −
P
D⊆A βD =
P
D⊆(Q∪Eck)
βD −
P
D⊆Q βD.
As in case 1 this may be simplified to:
X
D⊆(A∪Eck),D*A,D*Eck
βD =
X
D⊆(Q∪Eck),D*Q,D*Eck
βD. (17)
Recall that by the inductive hypothesis βB∪F = 0, for subsets B of Ek strictly smaller than A
and non-empty F ⊆ Eck. Thus all terms on the rhs of equation (17) are zero, henceP
D⊆(A∪Eck),D*A,D*Eck
βD = 0. As before, this implies βA∪F = 0, for all non-empty F ⊆ Eck.
This completes the proof of the inductive step. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Suﬃciency Proposition 3.1 has already established
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suﬃciency.
Necessity Now assume that νEk is a JP-capacity with the same α for 1 6 k 6 K and μ is a
belief function. Let δ = βS > 0. Then
P
D&S βD = 1− δ.
For 1 6 k 6 K, define qk = 11−δ
P
D⊆Ek βB. If qk 6= 0 define a capacity μk on Ek by
μk (A) =
1
(1−δ)qk
P
D⊆A βB for A ⊆ Ek. It is clear that μk is convex since its Möbius inverse
is non-negative. If qk = 0, define μk by μk (A) = 0, A & Ek;μk (Ek) = 1. If B is an arbitrary
(proper) subset of S, then
μ (B) =
X
D⊆B
βD =
KX
k=1
X
D⊆B∩Ek
βD +
X
D⊆B
D*B∩Ek,16k6K
βD.
By Lemma A.1, if A ⊆ Ek, for all non-empty F ⊆ Eck, βA∪F = 0, for 1 6 k 6 K, hence the
last sum is zero. Thus μ (B) =
PK
k=1
P
D⊆B∩Ek βD = (1− δ)
PK
k=1 qkμk (B ∩Ek) . Clearly
μ (S) = 1. Thus ν is a PAJP capacity.
Proof of Proposition 3.3 For 1 6 k 6 K, let Fk ⊆ Ek be such that λ (μk) = μ¯k (Fk) −
μk (Fk) . Define F =
SK
k=1 Fk. Now let A be an arbitrary subset of S. Then μ¯ (A)− μ (A)
= δ + (1− δ)
KX
k=1
qk [1− μk (Ac ∩Ek)− μk (A ∩Ek)] 6 δ + (1− δ)
KX
k=1
qkλ (μk) , (18)
which establishes that λ (μ) > δ + (1− δ)
PK
k=1 qkλ (μk) . Note also that equation (18) holds
with equality if A = F, which implies λ (μ) 6 δ + (1− δ)
PK
k=1 qkλ (μk) .
From Proposition 3.1, if event Ek is observed, the updated capacity ν0 (A) = αμ0k (A) +
(1− α) μ¯0k (A), where μ0k (A) =
(1−δ)qkμk(A∩Ek)
δ+(1−δ)qk . Thus the ex-post degree of ambiguity is,
λ (μ0k) = maxA⊆Ek {μ¯0k (A)− μ0k (A)}
= maxA⊆Ek
n
1− (1−δ)qkδ+(1−δ)qk +
(1−δ)qk
δ+(1−δ)qk [μ¯k (A)− μk (A)]
o
= δδ+(1−δ)qk +
(1−δ)qk
δ+(1−δ)qkλ (μk) .
Proof of Proposition 3.4 The eﬀect of the likelihood of the signal on ex-post ambiguity
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can be measured by the derivative:
∂λ(μ0k)
∂δ =
δ+qk−δqk−δ+δqk
(δ+(1−δ)qk)2
−
³
δ+qk−δqk+1−qk−δ+δqk
(δ+(1−δ)qk)2
´
qkλ (μk)
(by the quotient rule), = qk
(1−λ(μk))
(δ+(1−δ)qk)2
> 0. Thus an increase in the ex-ante ambiguity over the
state space increases ex-post ambiguity. Similarly,
∂λ(μ0k)
∂qk
= (1− δ) (δ+(1−δ)qk)λ(μk)−δ−(1−δ)λ(μk)
(δ+(1−δ)qk)2
=
− (1− δ) δ(1−λ(μk))+(1−δ)(1−qk)λ(μk)
(δ+(1−δ)qk)2
< 0. Thus an increase in the likelihood of the signal, qk, de-
creases ex-post ambiguity.
Lemma A.2 Let E1, ..., EK be a partition of S and let σ be a convex or concave capacity on S
such that
PK
i=1 σ(Ei) = 1 then for any B ⊆ S, σ(B) =
PK
i=1 σ(B ∩Ei).
Proof. First assume that σ is concave and K = 2. Define sets C and D by C = (B ∩E1) ∪
E2,D = E1 ∪ (B ∩E2) . By concavity, σ (C) 6 σ (B) + σ (E2) − σ (B ∩E2) , σ (D) 6 σ (B) +
σ (E1)−σ (B ∩E1) and 1 = σ (S) 6 σ (C)+σ (D)−σ (B) . Substituting we obtain 1 6 σ (B)+
σ (E2)−σ (B ∩E2)+σ (B)+σ (E1)−σ (B ∩E1)−σ (B) = 1+σ (B)−σ (B ∩E2)−σ (B ∩E1)
or σ (B ∩E2) + σ (B ∩E1) 6 σ (B) . However the opposite inequality follows directly from
concavity, which establishes the result in this case. The general result follows by repeated
application of the result for K = 2. If σ is convex the result can be proved by reversing the
inequalities in the above proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.5 First note that the case α = 1 is proved by Theorem 2.1 in
Eichberger et al. (2005). If α = 0 a similar argument will establish the result. Thus we may
assume α 6= 0, 1.
2⇒1 Condition (2) implies that we may define a probability distribution over the partition
E1, ..., EK by setting qk = μ (Ek) for 1 6 k 6 K. Lemma A.2 implies that for A ⊆ S, μ (A) =PK
k=1 μ (A ∩Ek) =
PK
k=1 qkμk (A ∩Ek) , where μk is a capacity on Ek defined by μk (B) =
μ(B)
qk
for B ⊆ Ek. Thus ν =
PK
k=1 qk [αμk + (1− α) μ¯k] , which implies that ν is an PAJP capacity.
Hence we may apply Proposition 3.1 to deduce that the GBU update of ν conditional on Ek is
νk = αμk (A) + (1− α) μ¯k (A) .
28
Suppose that bk ∈ A (Ek) is preferred to ak conditional on Ek, for 1 6 k 6 K. Then
Z
u (bk) dνk >
Z
u (ak) dνk, for 1 6 k 6 K, (19)
with at least one strict inequality. Define b ∈ A (S) , by b (s) = bk (s) if s ∈ Ek, for 1 6 k 6 K.
We shall show that b is preferred to a in the first period, which implies dynamic consistency.
Let the range of a (i.e. the set of outcomes generated by act a) be denoted by {x1, ..., xm} ,
where the outcomes have been numbered so that, u (x1) > u (x2) > ... > u (xm) . Also define
Ai = {s ∈ S : a (s) ∈ {x1, ..., xi}} . From the definition of the Choquet integral:R
u (a) dν = u(x1)ν(A1) +
Pm
i=2 u(xi) [ν (Ai)− ν (Ai−1)]
= u(x1) [αμ (A1) + (1− α) μ¯ (A1)]
+
Pm
i=2 u(xi) [αμ (Ai) + (1− α) μ¯ (Ai)− αμ (Ai−1)− (1− α) μ¯ (Ai−1)] .
By Lemma A.2 this may be rewritten asPK
k=1 u(x1) [αμ (A1 ∩Ek) + (1− α) μ¯ (A1 ∩Ek)]
+
PK
k=1
Pm
i=2 u(xi) [αμ (Ai ∩Ek) + (1− α) μ¯ (Ai ∩Ek)− αμ (Ai−1 ∩Ek)− (1− α) μ¯ (Ai−1 ∩Ek)]
=
PK
k=1
R
u (aEk) dνk. Similarly
R
u (b) dν =
PK
k=1
R
u (bk) dνk.
Thus
R
u (b) dν >
R
u (a) dν, which implies that act a could not be chosen in the first period.
It follows that the decision maker is dynamically consistent.
1⇒2 Suppose that the decision maker is dynamically consistent. Consider first the case
K = 2. Since the partition is non-trivial, we may find events, A,B,C, and D such that, E1 =
A ∪B, E2 = C ∪D, where A∩B = C ∩D = ∅. Consider acts a, b, c, e, f and g as described in
the following table:
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E1 E2
A B C D
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1 β 0
c 0 0 1 1
e 0 0 β 0
f β β 1 1
g β β β 0
We can ensure that acts with these values exist by appropriately normalizing the utility
function, (recall that X is convex). Note that
R
a1dν1 =
R
b1dν1,
R
c1dν1 =
R
e1dν1,
R
f1dν1 =R
g1dν1;
R
a2dν2 =
R
c2dν2 =
R
f2dν2 and
R
b2dν2 =
R
e2dν2 =
R
g2dν2. By continuity and
strong monotonicity we may choose β so that
R
a2dν2 =
R
b2dν2. Since α 6= 1, β > 1. Dynamic
consistency then implies that a ∼ b, c ∼ e and f ∼ g. By evaluating the Choquet integrals we
find: 1 = (β − 1) ν (C) + ν (E1 ∪ C) , ν (E2) = βν (C) and βν (E1 ∪ C) = βν (E1) + 1− ν (E1) .
Hence ν (E1 ∪ C) = 1− (β − 1) ν (C) = 1− β−1β ν (E2) ,
βν (E1) + 1− ν (E1) = β − (β − 1) ν (E2) ,
1− β = (1− β) ν (E1) + (1− β) ν (E2)⇔ ν (E1) + ν (E2) = 1.
Thus αμ (E1) + (1− α) μ¯ (E1) + αμ (E2) + (1− α) μ¯ (E2) = 1.
Expanding αμ (E1) + (1− α)− (1− α)μ (E2) + αμ (E2) + (1− α)− (1− α)μ (E1) = 1,
or (1− 2α)−(1− 2α)μ (E2)−(1− 2α)μ (E1) = 0. Since α 6= 12 , this implies μ (E1)+μ (E2) = 1.
The general case can be established as follows. We can apply the above argument to F1 = E1
and F2 =
[K
k=2
Ek to deduce that dynamic consistency implies μ (F1)+μ (F2) = 1. By repeated
application of this result we may deduce that
PK
k=1 μ (Ek) = 1.
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